•7:32 PM
On 23rd September,
2013, army claimed to have killed a ‘dreaded militant’ while ‘infiltrating’
across the LoC (Line of Control) in the Lastak forests of Machil sector in
Kupwara district. Indian army had further claimed to have recovered from his
possession “an AK rifle, 12 pistols and huge cache of ammunition” after
“killing him in a fierce gunfight.” (Rising Kashmir, 27th September,
2013)
As the body was handed over by
Army to local police, it was found that the killed was an old man of 70 years. At
his age and physical strength the claims of army about recoveries made from him
raised serious doubts of authenticity. It was impossible for a frail old man to
be able to carry such loads of ammunition and trek over the hazardous, tough LoC
terrain to infiltrate. Militants have always been known to be young men,
pushing over the treacherous LoC journey that often results in firefights. The old man had been had been visibly shot
dead from point blank range, and this fact too belied the claims of Indian army
about a “fierce fight where the infiltrator was killed.” But such claims have
been made too often in Kashmir, which later got deflated, notwithstanding
denials by New Delhi. We remember how in July 2010, Indian army officials
(eight army men including a Colonel and two Majors were accused) had led three
unarmed local Kashmiri boys to Machil, by offering jobs and petty money, and
then killed them in a fake encounter claiming them to be “dreaded militants trying to cross LoC.” All this was done to earn
monetary rewards and career benefits that India has been offering its forces in
Kashmir. In yet another incident in April 2010, Indian Army had been accused of
killing an old local beggar (again 70 years old) at Devar Vilgam in Kupwara
district and labeling him as a “dreaded militant”. In the infamous Pathribal
fake encounter case, personnel of Indian 7 Rashtriya Rifles had claimed to have
killed five “dreaded terrorists” at Pathribal village in District Anantnag on 25th
March, 2000. They also had claimed recovery of huge quantities of arms and
ammunition from the five killed. After massive protests by locals forced an
investigation, it came to light that all five were innocent civilians, who had
been abducted by security forces and later killed in a fake encounter at
Pathribal. Indian media here also had initially presented this incident as
another achievement by the armed forces against “terror”, overlooking the facts
behind the fake encounter.
The26th September (2013) attack
on the Indian Army's 16th Cavalry tank unit at Samba has also raised too many
unanswered questions. It was claimed that the three attacking militants had
crossed border in Jammu region within 12 to 14 hours, prior to the attack. With
the border between Indian held Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan sealed by
multiple layers of security including electrified fencing, modern thermal
imaging devices, manned heavily by Indian Border Security Force and supported
by floodlighting across this border line, how could any infiltration have even
passed unnoticed? And even after these armed men had attacked and killed at the
Hiranagar police station, how could they have travelled all the way towards
Samba, undetected, attacking the army unit without much initial resistance
there. How was it even possible to have such a lowered guard at the army camp,
or smooth passage for the attackers even after an alert had been sounded post
the Hiranagar attack? I am not suggesting that it could be an inside ops, but
was the (unlikely) lowering of guard at Hiranagar border, the lack of reaction after
the Hiranagar attack and the low perimeter defence at the Samba army unit a coincidental
laxity or more than that?
Few days before the Samba attack
happened, Indian army had claimed a massive infiltration bid taking place at Shalbato
Jamagund in Keran, Kupwara district on the intervening night of 23rd
September. The two incidents may not have been linked, but both have raised
questions about the participants of Kashmir conflict. Initially the Army
claimed that 30 – 40 militants were involved and that more than 10 of them had
been killed. But in later days these statements kept fluctuating. Not only did
the Indian army project it as a major infiltration bid aimed at “destabilizing
Kashmir”, the Indian media also played its act by adding jingoistic hype to
these claims thus deliberately deflating any peace overturns between Indian and
Pakistan over Kashmir. This LoC ‘operation’ was however suddenly called off by
the Indian army, after 15 days of “fierce encounter claims” and war posturing,
but many questions were again left unanswered about the Keran episode. While the
Indian army had earlier claimed that they had “cordoned off the militants”,
they could not explain how these militants could have sustained a fight for 15
long days, with no possibility of ammunition refilling and food supplies if they
had been really cordoned. They surely would have needed war like ammunition
stores to sustain a 24 hour fight for 15 days against huge columns of Indian
army (in addition to other units, two brigades the 268th and the 68th
Mountain Brigades were involved in this operation). Where did such ammunition
exist on the ‘cordoned LoC’, which would fight such a mammoth army machine?
Even while the Indian army
claimed that they had killed 10 to 15 militants, not a single corpse was
retrieved or presented as proof of these killings. The images of militant corpses
flashed across Indian media while ‘crossing the LoC’ were actually from Fateh
Gali and Gujjardar areas, which are far from the Shalbato Jamagund area, hence
these encounters cannot be connected. There were other reports in the Indian
media, attributed to the army, that militants had succeeded in retrieving bodies
of killed militants across the LoC. But given that it would take two or more
men to retrieve a corpse from LoC, how would it be possible for dozens of men
to drag corpses across LoC when thousands of Indian army guns (especially special
forces snipers) were being fired at this spot? And how could the corpses have
even been retrieved across LoC given the initial claim of a cordon by Indian
army?
Indian media claimed that the
army had recovered medicines, ID cards and uniforms from militants, proudly
displaying them as proof of these incursion and ‘encounter’ events. But when
have you heard of dying militants leaving behind ID cards and uniforms while
their corpses vanish in thin air? And since when did militants need to carry ID
cards while infiltrating into Kashmir? Do they show ID cards at the LoC to be
let in? Indian Army also claimed to have killed militants in hostile,
inaccessible territory at Keran after a “fierce encounter lasting days”. How
did they get access to militant ID cards and uniforms sans corpses during a
continued ‘fierce encounter’? Do militants even wear any uniforms in the first
place?
As Indian Express reported (on
Wednesday, 9th September 2013) “After
the initial sighting on September 23, there was never any concrete evidence
that dozens of militants were holed up. Also, there was no recorded ceasefire
violation in the area by the Pakistani army.” Reports point out that while
militants tried to infiltrate on 23rd September, they must have
withdrawn immediately after a firefight with Indian forces. So what was the
Indian army imagining and firing at near LoC for 15 days, ghosts of Keran?
While there might have been incursion attempts on 23rd September, but the enactment that followed in the coming days seemed anything but the truth. Given the fact Kashmir has become a big conflict enterprise for too many players, each incident and its inflated presentment is aimed at whipping a mass mindset (call it hysteria) in India and worldwide. And such conflict canvas is only drawn to keep the military conflict in Kashmir raging for bigger political and war machine interests. A peek into this conflict enterprise was given in “The Meadow” by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark. Sadly in this conflict enterprise, Kashmiris have been relegated to the firewood used to burn for bigger political interests. Now for many days these bloody political interests will be pimped shamelessly on TV channel debates, where the Ghosts of Keran will be resurrected every evening by jingoistic anchors and worn masks of terror by half baked self assuming experts, to whip Kashmir hysteria in the prelude to 2014.
While there might have been incursion attempts on 23rd September, but the enactment that followed in the coming days seemed anything but the truth. Given the fact Kashmir has become a big conflict enterprise for too many players, each incident and its inflated presentment is aimed at whipping a mass mindset (call it hysteria) in India and worldwide. And such conflict canvas is only drawn to keep the military conflict in Kashmir raging for bigger political and war machine interests. A peek into this conflict enterprise was given in “The Meadow” by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark. Sadly in this conflict enterprise, Kashmiris have been relegated to the firewood used to burn for bigger political interests. Now for many days these bloody political interests will be pimped shamelessly on TV channel debates, where the Ghosts of Keran will be resurrected every evening by jingoistic anchors and worn masks of terror by half baked self assuming experts, to whip Kashmir hysteria in the prelude to 2014.
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